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Abstract—A copy-move forgery is created by copying and
pasting content within the same image, and potentially post-
processing it. In recent years, the detection of copy-move forg-
eries has become one of the most actively researched topics
in blind image forensics. A considerable number of different
algorithms have been proposed focusing on different types of
postprocessed copies. In this paper, we aim to answer which
copy-move forgery detection algorithms and processing steps
(e. g. , matching, filtering, outlier detection, affine transformation
estimation) perform best in various postprocessing scenarios.
The focus of our analysis is to evaluate the performance of
previously proposed feature sets. We achieve this by casting
existing algorithms in a common pipeline. In this paper, we
examined the 15 most prominent feature sets. We analyzed the
detection performance on a per-image basis and on a per-pixel
basis. We created a challenging real-world copy-move dataset,
and a software framework for systematic image manipulation.
Experiments show, that the keypoint-based features SIFT and
SURF, as well as the block-based DCT, DWT, KPCA, PCA
and ZERNIKE features perform very well. These feature sets
exhibit the best robustness against various noise sources and
downsampling, while reliably identifying the copied regions.
Index Terms—Image forensics, copy-move forgery, benchmark
dataset, manipulation detection, comparative study
I. INTRODUCTION
THE goal of blind image forensics is to determine theauthenticity and origin of digital images without the
support of an embedded security scheme (see e. g. [1], [2]).
Within this field, copy-move forgery detection (CMFD) is
probably the most actively investigated subtopic. A copy-
move forgery denotes an image where part of its content
has been copied and pasted within the same image. Typical
motivations are either to hide an element in the image, or to
emphasize particular objects, e. g. a crowd of demonstrators. A
copy-move forgery is straightforward to create. Additionally,
both the source and the target regions stem from the same
image, thus properties like the color temperature, illumination
conditions and noise are expected to be well-matched between
the tampered region and the image. The fact that both the
source and the target regions are contained in the same image
is directly exploited by many CMFD algorithms, e. g. [3]–
[28]. We will briefly review existing methods in Sec. II. An
example of a typical copy-move forgery is shown in Fig. 1.
The goal of the paper is to examine which CMFD method
to use under different image attributes, like different image
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Fig. 1. Example image of a typical copy-move forgery. Left: the original
image. Right: the tampered image. An example output of a CMFD detector
for this image is shown in Fig. 13.
sizes and quantities of JPEG compression. Some limited prior
work already exists on this topic, e. g. [8], [29]. However,
to our knowledge, the scope of such prior work is typically
limited to the particular algorithm under examination. In this
paper, we adopt a practitioner’s view to copy-move forgery
detection. If we need to build a system to perform CMFD
independent of image attributes, which may be unknown,
which method should we use? For that purpose, we created
a realistic database of forgeries, accompanied by a software
that generates copy-move forgeries of varying complexity.
We defined a set of what we believe are “common CMFD
scenarios” and did exhaustive testing over their parameters.
A competitive CMFD method should be able to cope with
all these scenarios, as it is not known beforehand how the
forger applies the forgery. We implemented 15 feature sets
that have been proposed in the literature, and integrated them
in a joint pipeline with different pre- and postprocessing
methods. Results show, that keypoint-based methods have a
clear advantage in terms of computational complexity, while
the most precise detection results can be achieved using
Zernike moments [24].
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we present
existing CMFD algorithms within a unified workflow. In
Sec. III, we introduce our benchmark data and the software
framework for evaluation. In Sec. IV we describe the employed
error metrics. The experiments are presented in Sec. V. We
discuss our observations in Sec. VI. Sec. VII contains a brief
summary and closing remarks.
II. TYPICAL WORKFLOW FOR COPY-MOVE FORGERY
DETECTION
Although a large number of CMFD methods have been
proposed, most techniques follow a common pipeline, as
shown in Fig. 2. Given an original image, there exist two
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Fig. 2. Common processing pipeline for the detection of copy-move
forgeries. The feature extraction differs for keypoint-based features (top) and
block-based features (bottom). Except of method-specific threshold values, all
remaining steps are the same.
processing alternatives. CMFD methods are either keypoint-
based methods (e. g. [3], [11], [22]) or block-based methods
(e. g. [4]–[7], [9], [10], [12]–[21], [23]–[28]). In both cases,
preprocessing of the images is possible. For instance, most
methods operate on grayscale images, and as such require
that the color channels be first merged. For feature extrac-
tion, block-based methods subdivide the image in rectangular
regions. For every such region, a feature vector is computed.
Similar feature vectors are subsequently matched. By contrast,
keypoint-based methods compute their features only on image
regions with high entropy, without any image subdivision.
Similar features within an image are afterwards matched. A
forgery shall be reported if regions of such matches cluster
into larger areas. Both, keypoint- and block-based methods
include further filtering for removing spurious matches. An
optional postprocessing step of the detected regions may also
be performed, in order to group matches that jointly follow a
transformation pattern.
Due to differences in the computational cost, as well as the
detected detail, we consider the difference between block- and
keypoint-based methods very important. Thus, we separately
describe these two variants for feature vector computation in
the next two subsections, Sec. II-A and Sec. II-B, respectively.
Additional relevant details to the remaining steps in the
pipeline are presented below.
a) Matching: High similarity between two feature de-
scriptors is interpreted as a cue for a duplicated region.
For block-based methods, most authors propose the use of
lexicographic sorting in identifying similar feature vectors
(see e. g. [4]–[7], [9], [10], [12]–[19], [21], [23]–[28]). In
lexicographic sorting a matrix of feature vectors is built so
that every feature vector becomes a row in the matrix. This
matrix is then row-wise sorted. Thus, the most similar features
appear in consecutive rows.
Other authors use the Best-Bin-First search method derived
from the kd-tree algorithm [30] to get approximate nearest
neighbors [11], [20], [22]. In particular, keypoint-based meth-
ods often use this approach. Matching with a kd-tree yields
a relatively efficient nearest neighbor search. Typically, the
Euclidean distance is used as a similarity measure. In prior
work [31], it has been shown that the use of kd-tree matching
leads, in general, to better results than lexicographic sorting,
but the memory requirements are significantly higher. Note,
however, that the dimensions of some feature sets are ordered
by importance (for instance, in [13], [18], [32]). For these
features, the performance gain over lexicographic sorting is
minimal. In our setup we matched feature vectors using the
approximate nearest neighbor method of Muja et al. [33]. It
uses multiple randomized kd-trees for a fast neighbor search.
b) Filtering: Filtering schemes have been proposed in
order to reduce the probability of false matches. For instance,
a common noise suppression measure involves the removal of
matches between spatially close regions. Neighboring pixels
often have similar intensities, which can lead to false forgery
detection. Different distance criteria were also proposed in
order to filter out weak matches. For example, several authors
proposed the Euclidean distance between matched feature vec-
tors [20], [24], [27]. In contrast, Bravo-Solorio and Nandi [7]
proposed the correlation coefficient between two feature vec-
tors as a similarity criterion.
c) Postprocessing: The goal of this last step is to only
preserve matches that exhibit a common behavior. Consider
a set of matches that belongs to a copied region. These
matches are expected to be spatially close to each other in both
the source and the target blocks (or keypoints). Furthermore,
matches that originate from the same copy-move action should
exhibit similar amounts of translation, scaling and rotation.
The most widely used postprocessing variant handles out-
liers by imposing a minimum number of similar shift vectors
between matches. A shift vector contains the translation (in
image coordinates) between two matched feature vectors.
Consider, for example, a number of blocks which are simple
copies, without rotation or scaling. Then, the histogram of
shift vectors exhibits a peak at the translation parameters of
the copy operation.
Mahdian and Saic [20] consider a pair of matched feature
vectors as forged if: a) they are sufficiently similar, i. e. their
Euclidean distance is below a threshold, and b) the neigh-
borhood around their spatial locations contains similar fea-
tures. Other authors use morphological operations to connect
matched pairs and remove outliers [16], [22], [26], [28]. An
area threshold can also be applied, so that the detected region
has at least a minimum number of points [19], [22], [26], [27].
To handle rotation and scaling, Pan and Lyu [22] proposed to
use RANSAC. For a certain number of iterations, a random
subset of the matches is selected, and the transformations
of the matches are computed. The transformation which is
satisfied by most matches (i. e. which yields most inliers)
is chosen. Recently, Amerini et al. [3] proposed a scheme
which first builds clusters from the locations of detected
features and then uses RANSAC to estimate the geomet-
ric transformation between the original area and its copy-
moved version. Alternatively, the Same Affine Transformation
Selection (SATS) [8] groups locations of feature vectors to
clusters. In principle, it performs region growing on areas that
can be mapped onto each other by an affine transformation.
More precisely, if the features computed on three spatially
close blocks match to three feature vectors whose blocks are
also spatially close, then these groups of blocks might be
part of a copied region. The affine transformation to map
both groups of blocks onto each other is computed. Further
blocks from the neighborhood are added if the matched pairs
satisfy the same affine transformation. For details, see [8].
Although not explicitly reported in this paper, we evaluated the
impact of each of these methods. Ultimately, we adopted two
strategies. For block-based approaches, we used a threshold
τ2 based on the SATS-connected area to filter out spurious
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detections, as SATS provided the most reliable results in early
experiments. To obtain pixel-wise results for keypoint-based
methods, we combined the methods of Amerini et al. and Pan
and Lyu. We built the clusters described by Amerini et al.,
but avoided the search for the reportedly hard to calibrate
inconsistency threshold [3]. Instead, clusters stop merging
when the distance to their nearest neighbors are too high, then
the affine transformation between clusters is computed using
RANSAC and afterwards refined by applying the gold standard
algorithm for affine homography matrices [34, pp. 130]. For
each such estimated transform, we computed the correlation
map according to Pan and Lyu [22]. For full details on our
implementation, and a more elaborate discussion on our choice
of postprocessing, please refer to the supplemental material.
To summarize, we present the joint CMFD algorithm below.
Given an M × N image, the detected regions are computed
as follows:
1) Convert the image to grayscale when applicable (ex-
ceptions: the features of Bravo-Solorio et al. [19] and
Luo et al. [7] require all color channels for the feature
calculation)
2) For block-based methods:
a) Tile the image in Bi overlapping blocks of size
b× b, where 0 ≤ i < ((M − b+ 1) · (N − b+ 1))
b) Compute a feature vector ~fi for every block Bi.
For keypoint-based methods:
a) Scan the image for keypoints (i. e. high entropy
landmarks).
b) Compute for every keypoint a feature vector ~fi.
These two steps are typically integrated in a key-
point extraction algorithm like SIFT or SURF.
3) Match every feature vector by searching its approximate
nearest neighbor. Let Fij be a matched pair consisting
of features ~fi and ~fj , where i, j denote feature indices,
and i 6= j. Let c(~fi) denote the image coordinates of the
block or keypoint from which ~fi was extracted. Then,
~vij denotes the translational difference (“shift vector”)
between positions c(~fi) and c(~fj).
4) Remove pairs Fij where ‖~vij‖2 < τ1, where ‖ · ‖2
denotes the Euclidean norm.
5) Clustering of the remaining matches that adhere to a
joint pattern.
• For block-based methods: Let H(A) be the number
of pairs satisfying the same affine transformation A.
Remove all matched pairs where H(A) < τ2.
• For keypoint-based methods: Apply homography-
based clustering as described in the paragraph
above.
6) If an image contains connected regions of more than τ3
connected pixels, it is denoted as tampered.
Please note that it is quite common to set the thresholds τ2
and τ3 to the same value.
A. Block-based Algorithms
We investigated 13 block-based features, which we consid-
ered representative of the entire field. They can be grouped
TABLE I
GROUPING OF EVALUATED FEATURE SETS FOR COPY-MOVE FORGERY
DETECTION.
Group Methods Feature-length 1
Moments
BLUR [20] 24
HU [26] 5
ZERNIKE [24] 12
Dimensionality
reduction
PCA [23] –
SVD [13] –
KPCA [4] 192
Intensity
LUO [19] 7
BRAVO [7] 4
LIN [18] 9
CIRCLE [27] 8
Frequency
DCT [10] 256
DWT [4] 256
FMT [6] 45
Keypoint SIFT [11], [22], [3] 128SURF [36], [37] 64
in four categories: moment-based, dimensionality reduction-
based, intensity-based, and frequency domain-based features
(see Tab. I).
Moment-based: We evaluated 3 distinct approaches within
this class. Mahdian and Saic [20] proposed the use of 24
blur-invariant moments as features (BLUR). Wang et al. [26]
used the first four Hu moments (HU) as features. Finally,
Ryu et al. [24] recently proposed the use of Zernike moments
(ZERNIKE).
Dimensionality reduction-based: In [23], the feature match-
ing space was reduced via principal component analysis
(PCA). Bashar et al. [4] proposed the Kernel-PCA (KPCA)
variant of PCA. Kang et al. [13] computed the singular values
of a reduced-rank approximation (SVD). A fourth approach
using a combination of the discrete wavelet transform and Sin-
gular Value Decomposition [15] did not yield reliable results
in our setup and was, thus, excluded from the evaluation.
Intensity-based: The first three features used in [19] and [7]
are the average red, green and blue components. Additionally,
Luo et al. [19] used directional information of blocks (LUO)
while Bravo-Solorio et al. [7] consider the entropy of a block
as a discriminating feature (BRAVO). Lin et al. [18] (LIN)
computed the average grayscale intensities of a block and
its sub-blocks. Wang et al. [27] used the mean intensities of
circles with different radii around the block center (CIRCLE).
Frequency-based: Fridrich et al. [10] proposed the use of 256
coefficients of the discrete cosine transform as features (DCT).
The coefficients of a discrete wavelet transform (DWT) using
Haar-Wavelets were proposed as features by Bashar et al. [4].
Bayram et al. [6] recommended the use of the Fourier-Mellin
Transform (FMT) for generating feature vectors.
B. Keypoint-based Algorithms
Unlike block-based algorithms, keypoint-based methods
rely on the identification and selection of high-entropy im-
age regions (i. e. the “keypoints”). A feature vector is then
extracted per keypoint. Consequently, fewer feature vectors
1Some feature-sizes depend on the block size, which we fixed to 16× 16.
Also note that the feature-sizes of PCA and SVD depend on the image or
block content, respectively.
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are estimated, resulting in reduced computational complexity
of feature matching and post-processing. The lower number of
feature vectors dictates that postprocessing thresholds are also
to be lower than that of block-based methods. A drawback of
keypoint methods is that copied regions are often only sparsely
covered by matched keypoints. If the copied regions exhibit
little structure, it may happen that the region is completely
missed. We examined two different versions of keypoint-
based feature vectors. One uses the SIFT features while the
other uses the SURF features (see [36]). They are denoted as
SIFT and SURF, respectively. The feature extraction is imple-
mented in standard libraries. However, particular differences
of keypoint-based algorithms lie in the postprocessing of the
matched features, as stated in the previous section (confer
also [3], [11], [22], [36], [37]).
III. BENCHMARK DATA
Since image forensics is a relatively new field, there exist
only a few benchmarking datasets for algorithm evaluation.
Ng et al. [38] developed a dataset that consists of automatically
spliced images. In their dataset, portions of an image are quasi-
randomly copied and inserted in a different image, without
post-processing. Thus, the seams of the spliced regions often
exhibit sharp edges. Furthermore, these splices are frequently
not semantically meaningful. The CASIA dataset [39] ad-
dresses these issues. However, the majority of the images
are 384 × 256 pixels, and thus unrealistically small. Bat-
tiato et al. [40] presented a tampered image database which
focuses on the evaluation of detection methods based on
JPEG artifacts. These images are also of low resolution.
Almost all are 384 × 512 pixels. Other related databases
have slightly different goals. For instance, the Dresden Image
Database [41] is targeting methods for camera identification.
Similarly, Goljan et al. [42] presented a large-scale database
for the identification of sensor fingerprints.
To our knowledge, none of the existing databases is suited
for an in-depth evaluation of copy-move forgery techniques.
Concurrent to our work on this paper, Amerini et al. published
two ground truth databases for CMFD algorithms, called
MICC F220 and MICC F2000 [3]. They consist of 220 and
2000 images, respectively. In each of these datasets, half of the
images are tampered. The image size is 2048 × 1536 pixels.
The type of processing on the copy-move forgeries is limited
to rotation and scaling. Additionally, the source files are not
available. Thus, adding noise or other artifacts to the copied
region is not feasible. To address these issues, we built a
new benchmark database aiming at the analysis of consumer
photographs. Our images were created in a two-step process.
1) We selected 48 source images and manually prepared
per image semantically meaningful regions that should
be copied. We call these regions snippets. Three persons
of varying artistic skill manually created the snippets.
When creating the snippets, we asked the artists to
vary the snippets in their size. Additionally, the snippet
content should be either smooth (e. g. , sky), rough (e. g. ,
rocks) or structured (typically man-made buildings).
These groups can be used as categories for CMFD
Fig. 3. The image beachwood (upper left) is forged with a green patch
(bottom left) to conceal a building (upper right). A ground truth map (bottom
right) is generated where copy-moved pixels are white, unaltered pixels are
black and boundary pixels are gray.
images. More details on the categorization are provided
in the supplemental material. In total 87 snippets were
constructed.
2) To create copy-move forgeries in a controlled setup
(i. e. as the result of a parameterized algorithm), we
developed a software framework to generate copy-move
forgeries using the snippets. Common noise sources,
such as JPEG artifacts, noise, additional scaling or
rotation, are automatically included. Additionally, a pix-
elwise ground truth map is computed as part of this
process.
When creating the forgeries, we aimed to create realistic copy-
move forgeries in high-resolution pictures from consumer
cameras. Here, “realistic” refers to the number of copied
pixels, the treatment of the boundary pixels and the content of
the snippet. The average size of an image is about 3000×2300
pixels. In total, around 10% of the pixels belong to tampered
image regions.
In the ground truth images, pixels are identified as either
background or copy-move pixels, or as belonging to a third
class of otherwise processed pixels (e. g. painted, smeared,
etc.). The latter group of pixels includes border pixels of
snippets where the copied data is semi-transparent, in order to
form a smoother transition between the neighboring original
pixels and the copied one. This is a typical process in real
copy-move forgeries. Pixels that belong to this third class are
not fully opaque. Fig. 3 shows a typical ground truth setup.
The source image is shown on the top left, the tampered image
on the top right. The snippet is shown on the bottom left,
the ground truth map is shown on the bottom right. Here,
white denotes copied pixels, black denotes background. The
boundary pixels of the copied regions are marked gray for
visualization purposes. Please note that accurate ground truth
is difficult to define in such mixed data regions.
A software that can be downloaded together with the images
allows the flexible combination of the original image and the
tampered regions. Whenever a tampered image is created,
the corresponding ground truth is automatically generated.
Various kinds of modifications can be applied to the snippet,
e. g. the addition of Gaussian noise or the application of an
affine transformation on the snippet. When affine transfor-
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Fig. 4. Artificial example of several types of occlusion in the ground truth
generation. Top: original image. Second row: the two boats from the left
and the single boat from the right are copied one over another (exaggerated
example). Third row: visualization of where different image parts are copied.
Fourth row: When computing the ground truth for this copy-move forgery, the
occlusions must be computed according to the splicing pattern of the image.
mations are used, the ground truth must be (automatically)
adjusted accordingly. Care has to be taken in the case of
partial occlusion of snippets. Our software framework allows
multiple snippets to be arbitrarily reinserted in the image.
This can result in repeated snippet overlap. See Fig. 4 for an
exaggerated example. All occluded pixels have to be removed
from both the source and the target snippet.
Fig. 5 shows a selection of images from the database. On
the left column, the original image is shown, and on the right
column the corresponding “reference manipulation”. In the top
row, an example of a relatively straightforward tampering case
is presented, i. e. a “large” copied area with “good” contrast.
In the second example, the building in the background exhibits
a high contrast, regular pattern. Here, our aim was to create a
tampered image that would induce a large number of positive
matches. In the third row, a very low contrast region, the cat
baby, is copied. We expect keypoint-based methods to have
difficulties with such test cases. The last example contains
a large number of jellyfish. Here, though a single jellyfish
contains considerable contrast, the sheer number of jellyfish
is expected to make detection difficult. For better visualization,
we highlighted the copied elements in this image.
The software together with the images can be downloaded
from our web site2.
IV. ERROR MEASURES
We focused our evaluation on two performance charac-
teristics. For practical use, the most important aspect is the
ability to distinguish tampered and original images. However,
the power of an algorithm to correctly annotate the tampered
2http://www5.cs.fau.de/
Fig. 5. Example test cases (4 out of 48 base scenarios). Left: original image,
right: copy-move forgery. From top to bottom: lone cat (3039×2014 pixels)
containing a large, moderately textured copy region, fountain (3264× 2448
pixels) with self-similar glass front in the background, four cat babies
(3008×2000 pixels) where the copied cat baby has a very low-contrast body
region, and jellyfish chaos (3888×2592 pixels) containing high-detail, high-
contrast features. For better visualization, we highlighted the copied elements
in jellyfish chaos.
region is also significant, especially when a human expert is
visually inspecting a possible forgery. Thus, when evaluating
CMFD algorithms, we analyze their performance at two levels:
at image level, where we focus on whether the fact that an
image has been tampered or not can be detected; at pixel level,
where we evaluate how accurately can tampered regions be
identified.
A. Metrics
At image level, the important measures are the number of
correctly detected forged images, TP, the number of images
that have been erroneously detected as forged, FP, and the
falsely missed forged images FN. From these we computed
the measures Precision, p, and Recall, r. They are defined as:
p =
TP
TP + FP
, and r =
TP
TP + FN
. (1)
Precision denotes the probability that a detected forgery is
truly a forgery, while Recall shows the probability that a forged
image is detected. Recall is often also called true positive rate.
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Fig. 6. Illustration of three special cases of the ground truth generation
(see text for details). Left: Pixels at the boundaries of source and/or target
regions might be intensity-wise indistinguishable. Nevertheless, the ground
truth differentiates these pixels. Middle: Smeared or partially transparent
pixels (typically at boundaries) are excluded from the evaluation. Right: the
ground truth image. Note that by construction the ground truth is not affected
by the application of JPEG compression or additive noise.
In the tables we also give the F1 score as a measure which
combines precision and recall in a single value.
F1 = 2 · p · r
p+ r
. (2)
We used these measures at pixel level, too. In that case, TP
are the number of correctly detected forged pixels. FP denotes
the number of falsely detected forged pixels and FN are the
falsely missed pixels. The previous definition of Precision,
Recall and F1 measures also hold on the pixel level.
B. Protocol
Consider a CMFD algorithm that states per image whether
it is tampered or not. If a copy-operation has been conducted
in the image, it should raise an alarm, and vice versa. From a
practical viewpoint, this can be considered the most important
error measure, as the original goal – exposing digital forgeries
– is directly fulfilled. However, when performance is measured
on a per-image basis, the underlying reason that raised the
alarm is not really considered. Image-wise performance charts
do not typically distinguish between a method which correctly
marks most forged areas versus a method which almost
randomly marks regions.
To address this issue, we conducted a second series of
evaluations. Here, we examined the performance of detecting
copies on a per-pixel basis. In principle, such an approach
allows a much more finegrained statement about the details
that a method is able to detect. Ultimately, we consider these
results to offer more insight on the construction of future
CMFD algorithms. However, such an evaluation requires a
careful definition of ground truth, since it needs to clearly
specify which pixels have been copied. This is often not
a simple task. We identified three cases that need further
attention. Fig. 6 illustrates these cases. It shows the tampered
four copied cat babies and the generated ground truth. Three
particular regions are shown as closeups. On the left window,
the boundary between source and copy, consisting of black
fur, is shown. The intensities of the source region, as well
as the copied region, are almost indistinguishable. In such
cases we draw the boundary where the target region has
been inserted. This can also be seen from the grayish border
between source and copy in the ground truth image. In the
middle window, a closeup of the head is shown. Next to
the head is the seam of the copied region. However, seams
are almost always not 1-to-1 copies, but partially transparent,
smeared and so on. In the ground truth image, such pixels
can be recognized as being neither fully white nor fully black.
We consider such pixels as not well-defined for copy-move
forgery detection, as they exhibit a mixture of the copy and
the original background. Thus, for the evaluation of CMFD,
we excluded all such pixels. Finally, on the right window is
a closeup of the ground truth. The interior of the copied area
is fully white, i. e. every pixel counts for copy-move forgery
detection. However, further postprocessing, e. g. added noise,
or JPEG artifacts, can cause pixels in the copied region to
considerably deviate from pixels in the source region. One
could choose to exclude pixels that deviate significantly, but
it is unclear how to accurately define a sufficient amount of
deviation. Nonetheless, our goal is to examine the robustness
of CMFD approaches under such disturbances. Thus, we chose
to leave the ground truth “clean”, i. e. independent of any
applied postprocessing.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In the first series of experiments, we evaluated the detection
rate of tampered images. In the second series, we evaluated
pixelwise the detection of copied regions, in order to obtain
a more detailed assessment of the discriminative properties
of the features. In total, we conducted experiments with
about 4700 variants of the forged image (e. g. different scales
of snippets, different rotation angles of snippets, different
compression rates and their combinations) in order to better
understand the behavior of the different feature sets. The
complete result tables, as well as the source code to generate
these results, are also available from our web site.
A. Threshold Determination
Thresholds that are specific to a particular feature set were
manually adjusted to best fit the benchmark dataset. Most
threshold values for the processing pipeline (according to Sec.
II) were fixed across the different methods, when possible, to
allow for a fairer comparison of the feature performance.
Block size b: We chose to use a block size of 16 pixels.
We found this to be a good trade-off between detected image
details and feature robustness. Note that the majority of the
original methods also proposed a block size of 16 pixels.
Minimum Euclidean distance τ1: Spatially close pixels
are closely correlated. Thus, matches between spatially close
blocks should be avoided. In our experiments, we set the
minimum Euclidean distance between two matched blocks to
50 pixels. Thus, note that we are unable to detect copies when
the pixels are moved for less than 50 pixels. However, given
the high resolution of the benchmark images, this limitation
is not relevant for this work.
Minimum number of correspondences τ2: This threshold
reflects the minimum number of pairs which have to fulfill
the same affine transformation between the copied and the
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Fig. 7. Results at image level for different minimum number of correspon-
dences
pasted region. Thus, it compromises between improved noise
suppression, and false rejection of small copied regions. τ2
strongly depends on the features, as some features generate
denser result maps than others. Consequently, τ2 has to be cho-
sen for each feature individually. We empirically determined
appropriate values τ2 as follows. From our dataset, we created
CMFD benchmark images with JPEG quality levels between
100 and 70 in steps of 10. Thus, we evaluated on the 48
tampered images for 48×4 = 192 images. The JPEG artifacts
should simulate a training set with slight pixel distortions.
Per block-based feature, we estimated τ2 by optimizing the
F1-measure at image level. The results of the experiment are
shown in Fig. 7. Please note that throughout the experiments,
we were sometimes forced to crop the y-axis of the plots,
in order to increase the visibility of the obtained results. The
feature set-specific values for τ2 are listed in the rightmost
column of Tab. II. For the sparser keypoint-based methods,
we require only τ2 = 4 correspondences.
Area threshold τ3: In our experiments, we set τ3 = τ2 for
the block-based methods and τ3 = 1000 for the keypoint-based
methods to remove spurious matches3.
Individual feature parameters: We omitted the Gaussian
pyramid decomposition for the Hu-Moments (in contrast to
the original proposition [26]). This variant yields better results
gave better results on our benchmark data. For CIRCLE, we
had to use a different block size b = 17, as this feature set
requires an odd sized blocks for the radius computation. For
KPCA, two parameters had to be determined, namely the
number of samples M and the variance of the Gaussian kernel
σ. We set up a small experiment with two images (with similar
proportions as images from our database) in which for both
images a block of size 128 × 128 was copied and pasted.
Then we varied the parameters and chose the best result in
terms of the F1-measure. We observed that with increasing
σ and M the results became slightly better. We empirically
determined that values of M = 192 and σ = 60 offer an
overall good performance. Note that, these values are larger
than what Bashar et al. [4] used. For the remaining features,
we used the parameters as suggested in the respective papers.
3Alternatively, it would be possible to set the threshold for keypoint
matching stricter, and then to omit τ3 completely. However, we preferred
this variant (i. e. a more lenient matching threshold) in order to gain better
robustness to noise.
TABLE II
RESULTS FOR PLAIN COPY-MOVE AT IMAGE LEVEL IN PERCENT
Method Precision Recall F1 τ2
BLUR 88.89 100.00 94.12 100
BRAVO 87.27 100.00 93.20 200
CIRCLE 92.31 100.00 96.00 200
DCT 78.69 100.00 88.07 1000
DWT 84.21 100.00 91.43 1000
FMT 90.57 100.00 95.05 200
HU 67.61 100.00 80.67 50
KPCA 87.27 100.00 93.20 1000
LIN 94.12 100.00 96.97 400
LUO 87.27 100.00 93.20 300
PCA 84.21 100.00 91.43 1000
SIFT 88.37 79.17 83.52 4
SURF 91.49 89.58 90.53 4
SVD 68.57 100.00 81.36 50
ZERNIKE 92.31 100.00 96.00 800
Average 85.54 97.92 90.98 –
B. Detection at Image Level
We split these experiments in a series of separate eval-
uations. We start with the baseline results, i. e. direct 1-
to-1 copies (no postprocessing) of the pixels. Subsequent
experiments examine the cases of: noise on the copied region,
JPEG compression on the entire image, rotation and scaling
of the copied region.
1) Plain Copy-Move: As a baseline, we evaluated how
the methods perform under ideal conditions. We used the 48
original images, and spliced 48 images without any additional
modification. We chose per-method optimal thresholds for
classifying these 96 images. Interestingly, although the sizes
of the images and the manipulation regions vary greatly on
this test set, 13 out of the 15 tested features perfectly solved
this CMFD problem with a recall-rate of 100% (see Tab. II).
However, only four methods have a precision of more than
90%. This means that most of the algorithms, even under
these ideal conditions, generate some false alarms. This comes
mainly from the fact that the images in the database impose
diverse challenges, and the large image sizes increase the
probability of false positive matches.
2) Robustness to Gaussian noise: We normalized the image
intensities between 0 and 1 and added zero-mean Gaussian
noise with standard deviations of 0.02, 0.04, 0.06, 0.08 and
0.10 to the inserted snippets before splicing. Besides the
fact that a standard deviation of 0.10 leads to clearly visible
artifacts, 7 out of 15 features drop to under 50% recall rate,
while the precision decreases only slightly, see Fig. 8(a).
DCT exhibits a remarkably high recall, even when large
amounts of noise are added. PCA, SIFT, SURF and HU also
maintain their good recall, even after the addition of large
amounts of noise. At the same time, several methods exhibit
good precision. Among these, SURF provides a good balance
between precision and recall, followed by PCA.
3) Robustness to JPEG compression artifacts: We intro-
duced a common global disturbance, JPEG compression arti-
facts. The quality factors varied between 100 and 20 in steps
of 10, as provided by libjpeg4. Per evaluated quality level,
we applied the same JPEG compression to 48 forgeries and 48
4http://libjpeg.sourceforge.net/
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(b) JPEG compression
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(c) Rescaled copies
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(d) Rotated copies
Fig. 8. Experimental results at image level (see text for details).
complementary original images. For very low quality factors,
the visual quality of the image is strongly affected. However,
we consider at least quality levels down to 70 as reasonable
assumptions for real-world forgeries. Fig. 8(b) shows the
results for this experiment. The precision of SURF and SIFT
remains surprisingly stable, while block-based methods slowly
degenerate to a precision of 0.5. On the other hand, many
block-based methods exhibit a relatively high recall rate,
i. e. miss very few manipulations. Among these, KPCA, DCT,
ZERNIKE, BLUR and PCA constantly reach a recall of 90%
or higher.
4) Scale-invariance: One question that recently gained
attention was the resilience of CMFD algorithms to affine
transformations, like scaling and rotation. We conducted an
experiment where the inserted snippet was slightly rescaled,
as is often the case in real-world image manipulations. Specif-
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Fig. 9. Results for increasingly difficult combined transformations at image
level.
ically, we rescaled the snippet between 91% and 109% of
its original size, in steps of 2%. We also evaluated rescaling
by 50%, 80%, 120% and 200% to test the degradation of
algorithms under larger amounts of snippet resizing. Note
that we only scaled the copied region, not the source region.
Fig. 8(c) shows the results for this experiment. Most features
degenerate very fast at low rates of up- or down-sampling.
Some methods, namely KPCA, ZERNIKE, LUO, DWT, DCT
and PCA are able to handle a moderate amount of scaling.
For more extreme scaling parameters, keypoint-based methods
are the best choice: their performance remains relatively stable
across the whole scaling parameters.
5) Rotation-invariance: Similar to the previous experiment,
we rotated the snippet between 2◦ to 10◦, in steps of 2◦, and
also tested three larger rotation angles of 20◦, 60◦ and 180◦.
In prior work [8], [31], we already showed that ZERNIKE,
BRAVO and CIRCLE are particularly well-suited as rotation-
invariant features. Our new results, computed on a much more
extensive data basis, partially confirm this. Fig. 8(d) shows
the results. ZERNIKE features provide the best precision,
followed by SURF, CIRCLE, LUO and BRAVO. In the recall-
rate, BRAVO and ZERNIKE yield consistently good results and
thus seem to be very resilient to rotation. For small amounts
of rotation, KPCA and LUO perform also strongly, for higher
amounts of rotation, SURF features perform best. FMT, LIN,
HU and BLUR seem not to be well suited to handle variations
of rotation.
6) Robustness to Combined Transformation: In this ex-
periment, we examined the performance under several joint
effects. We rotated the snippet by 2◦, scaled it up by 1% and
compressed the image with a JPEG-compression level of 80. In
three subsequent setups, we increased per step the rotation by
2◦, increased scaling by 2%, and decreased the JPEG quality
by 5 points. In setup 5 and 6, slightly stronger parameters
were chosen: rotation was set to 20◦ and 60◦, scaling was set
to 120% and 140%, and JPEG quality was set to 60 and 50,
respectively. Fig. 9 shows that high precision can be achieved
for several feature sets. The best recall for small variations is
achieved by DCT and ZERNIKE. For the fourth step, SURF
and SIFT are almost on a par with ZERNIKE. Note that also
in the fourth step, a number of features exhibit a recall below
50%, and can thus not be recommended for this scenario. For
large rotations and scaling in the combined effects (see the
scenarios 5 and 6), SIFT and SURF show best precision and
very good recall.
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TABLE III
RESULTS FOR PLAIN COPY-MOVE AT PIXEL LEVEL IN PERCENT
Method Precision Recall F1
BLUR 98.07 78.81 86.19
BRAVO 98.81 82.98 89.34
CIRCLE 98.69 85.44 90.92
DCT 92.90 82.85 84.95
DWT 90.55 88.78 88.86
FMT 98.29 82.33 88.79
HU 97.08 74.89 82.92
KPCA 94.38 88.36 90.24
LIN 99.21 78.87 86.69
LUO 97.75 82.31 88.41
PCA 95.88 86.51 89.82
SIFT 60.80 71.48 63.10
SURF 68.13 76.43 69.54
SVD 97.53 76.53 83.71
ZERNIKE 95.07 87.72 90.29
Average 92.21 81.62 84.92
C. Detection at Pixel Level
A second series of experiments considers the accuracy
of the features at pixel level. The goal of this experiment
is to evaluate how precisely a copy-moved region can be
marked. However, this testing has a broader scope, as it is
directly related with the discriminating abilities of a particular
feature set. Under increasingly challenging evaluation data,
experiments on per-match level allow one to observe the
deterioration of a method in greater detail. We repeated the
experiments from the previous subsections, with the same test
setups. The only difference is that instead of classifying the
image as original or manipulated, we focused on the number
of detected (or missed, respectively) copied-moved matches.
For each detected match, we check the centers of two
matched blocks against the corresponding (pixelwise) ground
truth image. All boundary pixels are excluded from the eval-
uation (see also Fig. 3). Please note that all the measures,
e. g. false positives and false negatives, are computed using
all the pixels in the tampered images only. Note also, that it
is challenging to make the pixelwise comparison of keypoint-
and block-based methods completely fair: as keypoint-based
matches are by nature very sparse, we are not able to directly
relate their pixel-wise performance to block-based methods.
Thus, we report the postprocessed keypoint matches (as de-
scribed in Sec. II).
1) Plain Copy-Move: Tab. III shows the baseline results
for the dataset at pixel level. Similarly to the experiment
at image level, all regions have been copied and pasted
without additional disturbances. Note that we calibrated the
thresholds for all methods in a way that yields very competitive
(comparable) detection performances.
2) Robustness to Gaussian noise: We used the same ex-
perimental setup as in the per-image evaluation, i. e. zero-
mean Gaussian noise with standard deviations between 0.02
and 0.1 has been added to the copied region. The goal is to
simulate further postprocessing of the copy. At pixel level,
this experiment shows a clearer picture of the performance
of the various algorithms (see Fig. 10(a)). DCT, SIFT and
SURF provide the best recall. DCT also outperforms all
other methods with respect to precision. The performance of
the remaining features splits in two groups: CIRCLE, BLUR,
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(b) JPEG compression
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(c) Rescaled copies
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(d) Rotated copies
Fig. 10. Experimental results at pixel level (see text for details).
BRAVO, SVD and HU are very sensitive to noise, while
PCA, ZERNIKE, KPCA and DWT deteriorate slightly more
gracefully.
3) Robustness to JPEG compression artifacts: We again
used the same experimental setup as in the per-image evalu-
ation, i. e. added JPEG compression between quality levels
100 and 20. Fig. 10(b) shows the resilience at pixel level
against these compression artifacts. The feature sets forms two
clusters: one that is strongly affected by JPEG compression,
and one that is relatively resilient to it. The resilient methods
are SIFT, SURF, KPCA, DCT, PCA, ZERNIKE, and slightly
worse, DWT. The robustness of DCT was foreseeable, as
DCT features are computed from the discrete cosine trans-
form, which is also the basis of the JPEG algorithm.
4) Scale-invariance: The experimental setup is the same as
on the per-image level analysis. The copy is scaled between
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Fig. 11. Results for increasingly difficult combined transformations at pixel
level.
91% and 109% of its original size in increments of 2%.
Additionally, we evaluated more extreme scaling parameters,
namely 50%, 80%, 120% and 200%. As Fig. 10(c) shows,
7 feature sets exhibit scaling invariance for small amounts
of scaling. However, the quality strongly varies. The best
performers within these 7 feature sets are DWT, KPCA,
ZERNIKE, PCA and DCT. However, for scaling differences
of more than 9%, the keypoint-based features SIFT and SURF
are the only features sets that preserve acceptable precision
and recall.
5) Rotation-invariance: We evaluated cases where the
copied region has been rotated between 2◦ and 10◦ (in steps of
2◦), as well as for 20◦, 60◦ and 180◦. We assumed this to be a
reasonable range for practical tampering scenarios. Fig. 10(d)
shows the results. Most feature sets show only weak invariance
to rotation. Similar to the scaling scenario, SIFT and SURF
exhibit the most stable recall. From the block-based methods,
ZERNIKE, and also BRAVO and LUO are the best features for
larger amounts of rotation. Note that for the special case of
180◦, also FMT and and CIRCLE perform very well.
6) Robustness to Combined Transformation: Besides the
targeted study of single variations in the copied snippet, we
conducted an experiment for evaluating the joint influence of
multiple effects. Thus, we analyzed images where the copied
part was increasingly scaled, rotated and JPEG-compressed.
The setup was the same as on image level. Thus, scaling
varied between 101% and 107% in steps of 2%, rotation
between 2◦ and 8◦ in steps of 2◦, and the JPEG quality ranges
from 80 to 65 in steps of 5. Setup 5 and 6 have different
parameters, namely a rotation of 20◦ and 60◦, a scaling of
120% and 140%, and the quality of JPEG compression was
set to 60 and 50, respectively. The performance results are
shown in Fig. 11. In these difficult scenarios, SURF and
SIFT perform considerably well, followed by ZERNIKE, DCT,
KPCA and DWT. Note that it is infeasible to cover the
whole joint parameter space experimentally. However, we
take this experiment as an indicator, that the results of the
prior experiments approximately transfer to cases where these
transformations jointly occur.
D. Detection of Multiple Copies
In recent work, e. g. [3], the detection of multiple copies
of the same region has been addressed. While at image
level it typically suffices to recognize whether something has
been copied, multiple-copies detection requires that all copied
regions be identified. For such an evaluation, we modified the
TABLE IV
RESULTS FOR MULTIPLE COPIES AT PIXEL LEVEL. LEFT: SINGLE BEST
MATCH (AS CONDUCTED IN THE REMAINDER OF THE PAPER). RIGHT:
G2NN STRATEGY BY AMERINI et al. [3]. ALL RESULTS ARE IN PERCENT.
Method Precision Recall F1 Precision Recall F1
BLUR 95.24 52.50 67.31 89.91 54.11 65.20
BRAVO 97.54 52.58 68.16 88.75 58.27 67.58
CIRCLE 95.12 60.90 73.75 89.60 62.48 71.43
DCT 19.15 5.37 8.02 66.11 55.76 55.06
DWT 52.15 14.55 21.21 81.88 69.15 71.84
FMT 94.42 54.07 68.14 88.85 60.50 69.91
HU 94.98 54.08 68.64 89.98 54.61 65.99
KPCA 37.01 7.50 12.05 87.79 62.27 70.06
LIN 96.84 51.04 66.61 90.86 59.96 70.63
LUO 95.53 51.70 66.72 89.32 58.95 68.47
PCA 37.79 9.05 13.95 88.20 61.95 71.77
SIFT 11.37 4.95 6.74 17.00 7.34 10.07
SURF 37.49 21.86 26.15 38.31 22.93 26.79
SVD 91.91 59.06 71.51 71.98 58.91 59.33
ZERNIKE 83.15 22.00 33.52 87.55 61.87 69.64
Average 69.31 34.75 44.83 77.31 53.71 60.65
feature matching as follows. Instead of considering the nearest
neighbor, we implemented the g2NN strategy by [3]. This
method considers not only the single best-matching feature,
but the n best-matching features for detecting multiple copies.
Although our dataset contains a few cases of single-source
multiple-copies, we created additional synthetic examples. To
achieve this, we randomly chose for each of the 48 images a
block of 64× 64 pixels and copied it 5 times.
Tab. IV shows the results for this scenario at pixel level.
On the left side, we used the same postprocessing method
as in the remainder of the paper, i. e. we matched the single
nearest neighbor. On the right side, we present the results
using the g2NN strategy. For many feature sets, precision
slightly decreases using g2NN. This is not surprising, as
many more combinations of matched regions are now possible,
thus also increasing the chance for false matches. Still, some
methods alike BLUR, BRAVO, etc. are relatively unaffected
by this change in postprocessing, while others experience a
remarkable performance boost. In particular, DCT, DWT,
KPCA, PCA, ZERNIKE, i. e. the strong feature sets in the
prior experiments, can significantly benefit from the improved
matching opportunities of g2NN. As we discuss later (see
Sec. VI), we see this as yet another indicator that these features
exhibit very good discriminating properties. The performance
of SIFT and SURF drops considerably, mainly due to the fact
that the random selection of small blocks often yields regions
with very few matched keypoints. Although not explicitly
evaluated, we expect that selecting copy regions with high
entropy (instead of a random selection), would considerably
improve the detection rates of SIFT and SURF.
E. Downsampling: Computational Complexity versus Detec-
tion Performance
The evaluated methods vary greatly in their demand for
resources. One widely-used workaround is to rescale images
to a size that is computationally efficient. However, this raises
the issue of performance degradation. In order to analyze
the effects of downsampling, we scaled down all 48 noise-
free, one-to-one (i. e. without further postprocessing) forgeries
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from our database in steps of 10% of the original image
dimensions. Note that the detection parameters, as in the
whole section, were globally fixed to avoid overfitting. In this
sense, the results in this section can be seen as a conservative
bound on the theoretically best performance. We observe that
the performance of all features considerably drops. When
downsampling by a factor of exactly 0.5, results are still
better than for other scaling amounts (see Fig. 12(a) for
more details). This shows that global resampling has consid-
erable impact on the results. Some feature sets are almost
rendered unusable. KPCA, ZERNIKE, DWT, PCA, DCT,
LUO, FMT and BRAVO perform relatively well. SIFT and
SURF exhibit slightly worse precision, which might also be
due to a suboptimal choice of τ3 with respect to the reduced
number of keypoints in the downscaled images. However, the
recall rates are competitive with the block-based methods.
For completeness, we repeated the analysis of subsections
V-C3, V-C4 and V-C5 on a downsampled (50%) version of
the tampered images. The results are presented in Fig. 12(b) to
Fig. 12(d). The general shape of the performance curves is the
same as in the previous sections. Note that the performance of
recall is more strongly affected by downscaling than precision.
F. Resource Requirements
For block-based methods, the feature-size (see Tab. I) can
lead to very high memory use. For large images, this can reach
several gigabytes. Tab. V (right column) shows the per-method
minimum amount of memory in MB on our largest images,
obtained from multiplying the length of the feature vector
with the number of extracted blocks. In our implementation,
the effective memory requirements were more than a factor
of 2 higher, leading to peak memory usage for DCT and
DWT of more than 20GB. Note however, that the feature
size of DCT and DWT depends on the block size. For better
comparability, we kept the block size fixed for all methods.
Within a practical setup, the block size of these feature sets can
be reduced. Alternatively, the feature sets can be cropped to the
most significant entries. Some groups explicitly proposed this
(e. g. [23], [4]). In our experiments, as a rule of thumb, 8GB
of memory sufficed for most feature sets using OpenCV’s5
implementation for fast approximate nearest neighbor search.
The computation time depends on the complexity of the
feature set, and on the size of the feature vector. Tab. V shows
the average running times in seconds over the dataset, split
into feature extraction, matching and postprocessing. Among
the block-based methods, the intensity-based features are very
fast to compute. Conversely, BLUR, DCT and KPCA fea-
tures are computationally the most costly in our unoptimized
implementation. The generally good-performing feature sets
PCA, FMT and ZERNIKE are also relatively computationally
demanding.
Keypoint-based methods excel in computation time and
memory consumption. Their feature size is relatively large.
However, the number of extracted keypoints is typically an
order of magnitude smaller than the number of image blocks.
This makes the whole subsequent processing very lightweight.
5http://opencvlibrary.sourceforge.net/
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(d) Scaling
Fig. 12. Results for downsampled images: recall is significantly worse. From
top to bottom: Plain copy, JPEG, Rotation, Scaling.
On average, a result can be obtained within 10 minutes, with
a remarkably small memory footprint.
G. Qualitative Results
A more intuitive presentation of the numerical results is
provided for four selected examples, shown in Fig. 13. On
the left, the extracted contours of the keypoint-based method
SURF are shown. On the right the matches detected by the
block-based ZERNIKE features are depicted. Matched regions
are highlighted as brightly colored areas. In the top image,
the people which formed the top of the “5” (see Fig. 1) were
covered by a region copied from the right side of the image.
Additionally the circle was closed by copying another person.
SURF and ZERNIKE correctly detected all copied regions. In
the second row, three passengers were copied onto the sea. The
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TABLE V
AVERAGE COMPUTATION TIMES PER IMAGE IN SECONDS, AND THE
THEORETICAL MINIMUM PEAK MEMORY REQUIREMENTS IN MEGABYTES.
NOTE THAT THIS IS A LOWER BOUND, FOR INSTANCE OUR
IMPLEMENTATION ACTUALLY REQUIRES MORE THAN TWICE OF THE
MEMORY.
Method Feature Matching Postpr. Total Mem.
BLUR 12059.66 4635.98 12.81 16712.19 924.06
BRAVO 488.23 5531.52 156.27 6180.42 154.01
CIRCLE 92.29 4987.96 19.45 5103.43 308.02
DCT 28007.86 7365.53 213.06 35590.03 9856.67
DWT 764.49 7718.25 119.66 8606.50 9856.67
FMT 766.60 6168.73 8.07 6948.03 1732.62
HU 7.04 4436.63 5.36 4452.77 192.51
KPCA 6451.34 7048.83 88.58 13592.08 7392.50
LIN 12.41 4732.88 36.73 4785.71 346.52
LUO 42.90 4772.67 119.04 4937.81 269.52
PCA 1526.92 4322.84 7.42 5861.01 1232.08
SIFT 15.61 126.15 469.14 610.96 17.18
SURF 31.07 725.68 295.34 1052.12 19.92
SVD 843.52 4961.11 7.65 5816.15 1232.08
ZERNIKE 2131.27 4903.59 27.23 7065.18 462.03
Average 3549.41 4829.22 105.72 8487.63 2266.43
image was afterwards compressed with JPEG quality 70. SURF
yielded one correct match but misses the two other persons.
ZERNIKE marked all passengers correctly. However, it also
generated many false positives in the sky region.
In the third image, a 20◦ rotation was applied to the copy
of the tower. Both methods accurately detected the copied
regions. This observation is easily repeatable as long as: a)
rotation-invariant descriptors are used, and b) the regions are
sufficiently structured. As with JPEG-compression ZERNIKE
produced some false positives above the left tower. In the
bottom row, the two stone heads at the edge of the building
were copied in the central part. Each snippet was rotated
by 2◦ and scaled by 1%. The entire image was then JPEG
compressed at a quality level of 80. This image is particularly
challenging for keypoint-based methods, as it contains a num-
ber of high-contrast self-similarities of non-copied regions.
ZERNIKE clearly detected the two copies of the stone heads.
SURF also detected these areas, but marked a large number of
the background due to the background symmetries.
H. Results by Image Categories
To investigate performance differences due to different
texture of the copied regions, we computed the performances
according to categories. We subdivided the dataset into the
object class categories living, manmade, nature and mixed.
Although man-made exhibited overall the best performance,
the differences between the categories were relatively small.
This finding is in agreement with the intuition that the de-
scriptors operate on a lower level, such that object types do
not lead to significant performance differences. In a second
series of experiments, we used the artists’ categorization of
the snippets into smooth, rough and structure (see III). Overall,
these results confirm the intuition that keypoint-based methods
require sufficient entropy in the copied region to develop
their full strength. In the category rough, SIFT and SURF
are consistently either the best performing features or at least
among the best performers. Conversely, for copied regions
from the category smooth, the best block-based methods often
Fig. 13. Example qualitative results on the benchmark dataset for SURF (left)
and ZERNIKE (right). Top row: Plain copy-move, SURF and ZERNIKE detect
all copies. Second row: JPEG compression quality of 70 hides the small copied
people from the SURF keypoints. ZERNIKE tends to strongly overdetecting
homogeneous regions. Third row: 20◦ rotation poses no problem for both,
SURF and ZERNIKE. Bottom: combined transformations, in addition to highly
symmetric image content results in SURF producing a large number of false
positives. The block-based ZERNIKE features correctly detect the copied
statues.
outperform SURF and SIFT at image or pixel level. The
category structure ranges between these two extremes. The
full result tables for both categorization approaches can be
found in the supplemental material.
VI. DISCUSSION
We believe that the obtained insights validate the creation
of a new benchmark dataset. The selection of the evaluation
data for the CMFD algorithms is a non-trivial task. To our
knowledge, all existing test sets are somewhat limited in one
aspect or another. For instance, preliminary experiments sug-
gested that image size strongly influences the detection result
of CMFD algorithms. One workaround is to scale every input
image to a fixed size. However, as we show in Fig. 12, interpo-
lation itself influences the detection performance. Furthermore,
in the case of downsampling, the size of the tampered region is
also reduced, further inhibiting detection. Thus, we conducted
all experiments, unless otherwise stated, in the full image
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resolution (note, however, that the images themselves had
different sizes, ranging from 800× 533 pixels to 3900× 2613
pixels). This greatly increased the risk of undesired matches
in feature space, especially when a feature set exhibits weak
discriminative power. Consequently, differences in the feature
performance became more prominent.
Which CMFD method should be used? During the experi-
ments, we divided the proposed methods in two groups. SURF
and SIFT, as keypoint-based methods, excel in computation
time, memory footprint. The advantage in speed is so signifi-
cant, that we consider it worth applying these methods always,
independent of the detection goal. Tab. II and subsequent
experiments indicate slightly better result for SURF than for
SIFT. When a copied area has undergone large amounts of
rotation or scaling, SIFT and SURF are clearly the best choices.
One should be aware that keypoint-based methods often lack
the detail for highly accurate detection results. When regions
with little structure are copied, e. g. the cats image in Fig. 5,
keypoint-based methods are prone to miss them. In contrast,
highly self-similar image content, as the building in Fig. 13
can provoke false positive matches.
The best-performing block-based features can relatively re-
liably address these shortcomings. Experiments on per-image
detection indicate that several block-based features can match
the performance of keypoint-based approaches. We conducted
additional experiments to obtain stronger empirical evidence
for the superiority of one block-based method over another.
These experiments measured the pixelwise precision and recall
of the block-based approaches. Experiments on the robustness
towards noise and JPEG artifacts showed similar results. DCT,
PCA, KPCA, ZERNIKE and DWT outperformed the other
methods by a large margin w.r.t. recall. Their precision also
outperformed the other block-based methods for large amounts
of noise and heavy JPEG compression. As shown for example
in Fig. 13, a good precision leads to a low number of
false positive matches. When the copied region is scaled, the
aforementioned five block-based features also perform well for
small amounts of scaling. Note, however, that we were not
able to obtain good results with block-based methods using
larger scaling parameters. For rotated copies, ZERNIKE, LUO
and BRAVO, DWT, KPCA, DCT and PCA can handle small
degrees of rotation very well. In general, for detecting rotated
copies, ZERNIKE performed remarkably well.
In a more practical scenario, running a block-based CMFD
algorithm on full-sized images can easily exceed the available
resources. Thus, we examined, how block-based algorithms
perform when the examined image is downsampled by the
investigator to save computation time. Not surprisingly, the
overall performance drops. However, the best performing
feature sets remain relatively stable, and confirm the previous
results only at a lower performance level.
In all the previous discussion, we tailored our pipeline for
the detection of a single one-to-one correspondence between
source region and copied region. However, we also evaluated,
at a smaller scale, the detection of multiple copies of the
same region. We adapted the matching and filtering steps
to use g2NN, as proposed by Amerini et al. [3], so that
the n best-matching features were considered. Interestingly,
the already good features DCT, DWT, KPCA, PCA and
ZERNIKE profited the most from the improved postprocessing.
This re-emphasizes the observation that these feature sets are
best at capturing the relevant information for CMFD. With the
improved postprocessing by Amerini et al., the advantages of
these features can be fully exploited.
In a practical setup, one should consider a two-component
CMFD system. One component involves a keypoint-based
system, due to its remarkable computational efficiency, small
memory footprint and very constant performance. This allows
for instance the screening of large image databases. The
second component should be a block-based method, for close
and highly reliable examination of an image. In particular
when the added noise or transformations to the copied area are
small, block-based methods are considerably more accurate.
We consider ZERNIKE features as a good choice for this com-
ponent. For a block-based method, its memory and runtime
requirements are low, compared to the detection performance.
Note, however, that a final recommendation has of course to
be made based upon the precise detection scenario. We assume
that the provided performance measurements, together with the
publicly available dataset, can greatly support practitioners and
researchers to hand-tailor a CMFD pipeline to the task at hand.
For instance, one could imagine a fusion-based system, con-
sisting of the best features from each category. Alternatively,
other forensic tools, like resampling detection or detection
of double JPEG compression can compensate the current
shortcomings of existing CMFD approaches (see, e. g. [1]).
For instance, under moderate degrees of JPEG compression,
rescaled or rotated copies reliably exhibit traces of resampling.
Thus, rotation- and scaling invariant CMFD can be avoided
in such cases. Also, if a region is copied within a JPEG
image, there is a good opportunity that artifacts from double
JPEG-compression can be detected. As an added benefit, these
methods are computationally much more efficient than the
average CMFD algorithm. Thus, for future work, it will be
interesting to see how a joint forensic toolbox performs on
manipulated images.
VII. CONCLUSION
We evaluated the performance of different widely-used
features for copy-move forgery detection. In order to conduct
a thorough analysis, we created a challenging evaluation
framework, consisting of: a) 48 realistically sized base images,
containing b) 87 copied snippets and c) a software to replay
realistically looking copy-move forgeries in a controlled en-
vironment. We examined various features within a common
processing pipeline. The evaluation is conducted in two steps.
First, on a per-image basis, where only a tampered/original
classification has been done. In a second step, we performed
a more detailed analysis on a per-pixel basis.
Our results show, that a keypoint-based method, e. g. based
on SIFT features, can be very efficiently executed. Its main
advantage is the remarkably low computational load, combined
with good performance. Keypoint-based methods, however,
are sensitive to low-contrast regions and repetitive image
content. Here, block-based methods can clearly improve the
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detection results. In a number of experiments, five block-based
feature sets stood out, namely DCT, DWT, KPCA, PCA and
ZERNIKE. Among these, we recommend the use of ZERNIKE,
mainly due to its relatively small memory footprint.
We also quantified the performance loss when the copy-
move forgery detection is not conducted on the original image
sizes. This is an important aspect, as the resource requirements
for block-based CMFD methods on large images (e. g. 3000×
2000 pixels) become non-trivial.
We believe that the presented results can support the com-
munity, particularly in the development of novel crossover-
methods, which combine the advantages of separate features
in a joint super-detector. We also hope that our insights help
forensics practitioners with concrete implementation decisions.
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Supplementary Material to “An Evaluation of
Popular Copy-Move Forgery Detection Approaches”
Vincent Christlein, Christian Riess, Johannes Jordan, Corinna Riess and Elli Angelopoulou
VIII. CONTENTS OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
This document contains additional information about se-
lected topics which were only briefly addressed in the main
paper. We add details on the selection of τ2, we state results
using the F1 score, and finally add details on the database,
including the reference manipulations.
One such subject is the choice of τ2, i. e. the threshold
that filters out connected matched correspondences below a
minimum set size. As stated in Sec. V-A of the paper, τ2 is
chosen separately for every feature set. We explain and justify
our strategy for selecting τ2 in Sec. IX of this document. In
Sec. X, we present the F1 score for all evaluations in the
main paper. One advantage of the F1 score is that it subsumes
precision and recall in a single number. In Sec. XI, we add
details on the postprocessing methods for keypoint-based algo-
rithms. In Sec. XII, we describe the results on a per-category
evaluation of the proposed database. Finally, in Sec. XIII, we
add details on the description of the database, and present all
motifs including the associated reference manipulations.
IX. THRESHOLD DETERMINATION FOR THE MINIMUM
NUMBER OF CORRESPONDENCES
Assume that we found a cluster of matches which jointly
describes the same (affine) transformation. If the size of the
cluster exceeds the threshold τ2, the cluster is reported as a
copied area. We selected τ2 for every feature set individually.
This is necessary, in order not to punish a slightly weaker
performing feature set. Consider, for example, the case where
one feature set roughly matches a copied area, but has also
a considerable number of missed matches within this area. If
such a feature set detects a large number of small, disconnected
regions, a high value of τ2 would ignore the correct detections.
At the same time, if a feature set typically finds dense,
connected sets of matched correspondences, a low value of
τ2 would increase its sensitivity to noise. This consideration
compelled us to determine this threshold τ2 for every feature
type individually.
We assumed that it is infeasible to conduct a brute-force
search over all test cases for a reasonable value of τ2. Instead,
we searched over τ2 = 50, 100, . . . , 1000 on a very limited
postprocessing scenario. As stated also in the main paper,
this scenario included all images from the dataset. We used
original and tampered images without any postprocessing, and
under increasing levels of JPEG compression (conducted with
libjpeg), for quality levels from 100% down to 70% in
steps of 10%. The best values of τ2 over the entire set of test
images were selected for every method. The goal of adding
moderate JPEG compression is to avoid overfitting of τ2 to
“perfect” data. We illustrate this issue with a counter-example
(see Fig. 14). Here, we conducted a brute-force search for
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Fig. 14. Results for plain copy-move varying the minimum correspondence
threshold τ2. Left: per-image evaluation. Right: per-pixel evaluation.
TABLE VI
BEST τ2 , DETERMINED USING THE PER-IMAGE F1-MEASURE. IN THE
MIDDLE COLUMN, τ2 IS DETERMINED ON PLAIN 1-TO-1 COPIES, IN THE
RIGHT COLUMN ON MIXED JPEG-COMPRESSED IMAGES.
Method Plain Copy Copy+JPEG
BLUR 900 100
BRAVO 900 200
CIRCLE 900 200
DCT 900 1000
DWT 900 1000
FMT 900 200
HU 1000 50
KPCA 900 1000
LIN 900 400
LUO 800 300
PCA 1000 1000
SIFT 4 4
SURF 4 4
SVD 800 50
ZERNIKE 1000 800
Average 787 421
τ2 only on the clean images, containing only copied regions
without any postprocessing (i. e. 1-to-1 copies). If evaluated
at image level (see Fig. 14 left), the performance constantly
increases for all methods up to τ2 = 800, for most of them
until τ2 = 1000. Evaluating at pixel-level (see Fig. 14 right)
yields very similar results. Thus, if we used this result, we
could even set τ2 globally constant, to a value between 800
and 1000. However, such a choice adversely affects most of
the feature sets. To illustrate that, we computed a number of
results for τ2 = 1000.
In Tab. VI, we report the per-method best thresholds, once
determined from the plain copies (middle column), and once
for the mixed clean and JPEG-compressed images (right
column). The average value in the bottom row shows that the
JPEG artifacts decrease the optimum τ2 value to almost 50%.
To further demonstrate the sensitivity of τ2 to JPEG com-
pression, we performed two further evaluation scenarios (see
Tab. VII and Tab. VIII). Tab. VII reports the F1 scores on
images without postprocessing. Tab. VIII reports the F1 scores
on images with several different types of postprocessing.
Both tables relate the performance of individually selected
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TABLE VII
RESULTS FOR PLAIN COPY-MOVE, PER IMAGE. INDIVIDUAL τ2 (SEE
TAB. VI, RIGHT-COLUMN) VERSUS FIXED τ2 = 1000.
Method F1 (individual) F1 (τ2 = 1000)
BLUR 94.12 94.00
BRAVO 93.20 94.95
CIRCLE 96.00 100.00
DCT 88.07 88.07
DWT 91.43 91.43
FMT 95.05 96.91
HU 80.67 93.07
KPCA 93.20 93.20
LIN 96.97 97.92
LUO 93.20 94.00
PCA 91.43 91.43
SVD 81.36 95.83
ZERNIKE 96.00 96.00
Average 91.59 94.37
TABLE VIII
RESULTS FOR COMBINED TRANSFORMATIONS (2◦ ROTATION, UPSCALING
TO 101% AND 80 JPEG QUALITY-FACTOR), PER IMAGE. INDIVIDUAL τ2
(SEE TAB. VI, RIGHT-COLUMN) VERSUS FIXED τ2 = 1000.
Method F1 (individual) F1 (τ2 = 1000)
BLUR 59.74 36.92
BRAVO 75.00 49.28
CIRCLE 51.43 42.62
DCT 85.98 85.98
DWT 88.24 88.24
FMT 80.90 55.07
HU 60.78 41.18
KPCA 90.00 90.00
LIN 74.07 36.67
LUO 80.43 65.82
PCA 86.00 86.00
SVD 64.08 33.33
ZERNIKE 92.78 92.78
Average 76.11 61.84
thresholds versus fixed thresholds. In Tab. VII, it can be
seen that the individual selection of τ2 (middle column) leads
to slightly worse performance than a globally fixed, high
τ2 = 1000. Interestingly, Tab. VIII shows results for the
“combined transformations” variant in our evaluation of the
main paper, i. e. global JPEG compression at quality level 80,
and slight modifications on the copied region (rotation of 2◦,
upsampling of 101%). Note that for this scenario, we did not
conduct dedicated fine-tuning of τ2. Nevertheless, the average
for method-specific values of τ2 (Tab. VIII middle) are by a
large margin better than the fixed threshold τ2 = 1000 for plain
1-to-1 copies. Our further performance analysis was based on
the lower thresholds, as one of our goals is to evaluate the
influence of postprocessing artifacts on the features.
One alternative would be to optimize τ2 for every experi-
ment (e. g. Gaussian noise, or JPEG compression) separately.
However, we considered such a complete threshold fine-
tuning unrealistic. In practice, it is only expected that “some
postprocessing” has been done to better fit a copied region in
its environment. Thus, a successful CMFD algorithm must be
able to deal with a certain amount of uncertainty on the actual
type of postprocessing.
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(d) Rotation
Fig. 15. F1 scores for the experiments on the original image sizes
(corresponds to Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 in the main paper). Left: performance on
image level, right: performance at pixel level. From top to bottom: Gaussian
white noise, JPEG compression, rotation, scaling.
X. RESULTS WITH F1 SCORE
All plotted results in the main paper are presented using
precision and recall. However, in some cases (like the deter-
mination of τ2), a single number is required to more easily
compare feature sets. In the tables of the main paper, we
added the F1 score which subsumes precision and recall.
For completeness, we add here the results of the remaining
experiments from the main paper with respect to the F1 score.
The plots in Fig. 15 correspond to the results shown in Fig. 8
and Fig. 9 in the main paper. The left plot shows the results at
image level, while the right side shows the results for the same
experiment at pixel level. The order of the experiments, and
the experimental setup, is the same as in the main paper. Thus,
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Fig. 16. Downsampled versions of the input image up until 50% of its
original size. Left: performance at image level. Right: performance at pixel
level.
from top to bottom, results are presented for additive Gaussian
noise, varying degrees of JPEG compression, a limited amount
of scaling, and varying degrees of rotation. We relate the F1
scores to the precision and recall plots from the main paper.
In general, the F1 score captures large dynamics in precision
and recall. For the Gaussian noise, the large spread in the
recall mainly shapes both F1 scores, at image level and pixel
level. For the experiment on JPEG compression, the image
level differences in precision and recall are evened out in the
F1 score. At pixel level, the large differences in recall again
shape the F1 score. The recall also mainly influences the F1
scores on scaling and rotation.
Fig. 16 shows the F1 scores that correspond to Fig. 10 in
the main paper. It shows the performance deterioriation under
increasing downsampling. On the left side, we evaluated the
performance at image level, on the right side at pixel level.
The results of the F1 score are again mostly influenced by
the recall. Note that we omitted a performance evaluation at
image level in the main paper, mainly to improve the flow of
the presentation.
The F1 scores for varios scenarios applied on the down-
sampled version of the images are shown in Fig. 17 (see
Fig. 11 in the main paper). Again, on the left side, we show
the performance at image level, on the right side at pixel level.
From top to bottom, we present results on JPEG compression,
rotation and scaling of the copied snippet. Again, in all three
cases, recall mainly influences the F1 score.
XI. POSTPROCESSING OF KEYPOINT-BASED METHODS
We apply a hierarchical clustering on matched feature pairs,
i. e. assign each point to a cluster and merge them according
to a linkage-method, as described by Amerini et al. [3]. For
the linkage method we chose “single” linkage as it is very
fast to compute and as the choice of the linkage-method is
not critical [3]. On the other hand, the stop condition for
merging the clusters (“cut-threshold”) plays an important role.
Here, we did not use the inconsistency coefficient as proposed
by Amerini et al.. Instead, we rely on the distance between
the nearest clusters. Two clusters are merged if their distance
lies within the cut-threshold. We chose to use a cut-threshold
of 25 pixels for SIFT and 50 pixels for SURF. As a special
case, if we obtained less than 100 matches, the cut-threshold is
raised to 75 pixels. Note that the cut-thresholds are chosen in
a defensive way, such that typically multiple smaller clusters
remain, which are merged at a later stage of the algorithm.
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(c) Scale
Fig. 17. F1 scores for the experiment on downsampled version of the images
(corresponds to Fig. 11 in the main paper). Left: performance at image level.
Right: performance at pixel level. From top to bottom: JPEG compression,
rotation, scaling.
If a minimum of 4 correspondences connects two of these
clusters, we estimate with RANSAC the affine transformation
between the points that are connected by these correspon-
dences, analogously to Amerini et al. [3]. In contrast to prior
work, we further compute the optimal transformation matrix
from the inliers according to the gold-standard algorithm for
affine homography matrices [34, pp. 130]. Transformations
with implausibly large or small values are removed via thresh-
olding.
For large images containing large copied areas the transfor-
mation matrices of the clusters may often be similar. So, we
decided to merge them if the root mean square error (RMSE)
between two transformation matrices is below a threshold
of 0.03 for the scaling and rotation part of the matrix, and
below a threshold of 10 for the translation part. For these
merged clusters we reestimate the transformation with the
same procedure as above.
For each cluster we warp the image according to the
estimated transformation matrix and compute a correlation
map between the image and its warped version. From here on,
we follow the algorithm by Pan and Lyu [22]. For every pixel
and its warped version we compute the normalized correlation
coefficient with a window size of 5 × 5 pixels. To remove
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TABLE IX
CATEGORIZATION OF THE DATABASE BY OBJECT CLASSES.
Assigned images
Category Small copied area Large copied area
living giraffe, jellyfish chaos, cat-
tle, swan
four babies
nature fisherman, no beach,
berries,
Scotland, white, hedge,
christmas hedge, Malawi,
beach wood, tree
man-
made supermarket, bricks, statue,ship, sailing, dark and
bright, sweets, disconnected
shift, Egyptian, noise
pattern, sails, mask,
window, writing history,
knight moves
horses, kore, extension,
clean walls, tapestry, port,
wood carvings, stone ghost,
red tower
mixed barrier, motorcycle,
Mykene, threehundred,
Japan tower, wading,
central park
fountain, lone cat
noise in the correlation map, it is smoothed with a 7 × 7
pixels Gaussian kernel. Every smoothed correlation map is
then binarized with a threshold of 0.4, and areas containing
less than 1000 pixels were removed. Furthermore, areas where
no match lies were removed, too. Then, the outer contours
of each area is extracted and the inner part is flood-filled,
which closes holes in the contours. The output map is the
combination of all post-processed correlation maps. As a final
verification step, each area from the combined output map is
tested if it also has a correspondence which lies in another
marked area.
XII. DATABASE CATEGORIES
In the main paper, we report results on the full dataset. How-
ever, the performance of the feature descriptors undoubtedly
depends on the content of the image and the copied area. With
a subdivision of the dataset in smaller categories, we make an
attempt towards better explaining the performance differences
of the feature sets.
The design of a proper category-driven evaluation in image
forensics is still an open problem. We made a first attempt to-
wards a proper categorization using two different approaches.
We divided the images in multiple categories, once into object
categories and once in texture categories. The results are
reported in Sec. XII-A and Sec. XII-B, respectively.
A. Categorization by Object Classes
We split the images in categories where the copied regions
belong to one of the object categories living, nature, man-made
or mixed. Here, mixed denotes copies where arguably multiple
object types occur. Table IX lists which image belongs to
which category. In Sec. XIII, downsampled versions of the
images are presented together with the names of the images.
The number of images varies between the categories. The
smallest category is living containing 5 test cases, the largest
category is man-made (24 test cases). Note that the varying
category sizes pose no problem, as we only compute the
TABLE X
RESULTS FOR PLAIN COPY-MOVE PER OBJECT CATEGORY AT IMAGE
LEVEL (LEFT) AND AT PIXEL LEVEL (RIGHT), IN PERCENT.
Image level Pixel level
Method Living Nature Living Nature
BLUR 100.00 97.56 64.37 65.83
BRAVO 100.00 100.00 61.82 66.63
CIRCLE 100.00 100.00 66.09 69.97
DCT 100.00 90.91 67.27 59.47
DWT 100.00 100.00 66.77 67.51
FMT 100.00 100.00 64.85 68.35
HU 86.96 78.43 61.36 63.62
KPCA 100.00 100.00 68.46 68.77
LIN 100.00 100.00 67.00 67.35
LUO 100.00 97.56 58.46 65.98
PCA 100.00 100.00 71.01 67.08
SIFT 33.33 82.35 19.12 58.51
SURF 75.00 94.74 36.32 73.28
SVD 83.33 80.00 66.14 60.62
ZERNIKE 100.00 100.00 67.60 68.59
Average 91.91 94.77 60.44 66.10
Image level Pixel level
Method man-made mixed man-made mixed
BLUR 96.00 97.30 65.64 64.40
BRAVO 95.05 94.74 65.00 59.59
CIRCLE 97.96 94.74 71.62 68.91
DCT 89.72 90.00 68.82 58.86
DWT 89.72 87.80 68.42 66.64
FMT 95.05 94.74 69.95 67.98
HU 86.49 76.60 64.89 61.50
KPCA 91.43 92.31 70.56 70.37
LIN 97.96 97.30 69.57 66.11
LUO 96.00 94.74 65.03 59.59
PCA 89.72 94.74 69.88 69.35
SIFT 88.00 88.89 71.87 69.26
SURF 90.20 94.12 75.97 66.71
SVD 85.71 78.26 68.71 60.49
ZERNIKE 95.05 100.00 71.04 68.00
Average 92.27 91.75 69.13 65.18
performance within a category6. We used the same parameters
as for the evaluations in the main paper. Tab. X shows the F1
score for plain copy-move forgeries at image level (left) and
at pixel level (right). Note that all four categories perform
comparably at pixel level. However, at image level, most
feature sets perform best for living and nature.
The Figures 18, 19, 20 and 21 show the results for living,
nature, man-made and mixed under Gaussian noise, JPEG
compression, rotation, scaling and joint effects. Again, the
evaluation parameters were the same as in the main paper. At
pixel level, several feature sets perform better for nature than
for living. However, in several scenarios, the best results are
obtained in the categories man-made and mixed. We assume
that this comes from the fact that man-made objects often
exhibit a clearer structure, and as such encompass the task of
copy-move forgery detection.
B. Categorization by Texture
We investigated a second categorization of the dataset, this
time by texture. The dataset is divided in copied areas provid-
ing smooth, rough and structured content. Here, smooth and
6For instance, for classification tasks, a balanced size of each category can
prevent biased results. However, this is not of concern in our copy-move
forgery evaluation.
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Fig. 18. Performance in the category living at image level (left) and pixel
level (right).
rough serves as a distinction of texture properties, which can
be approximately seen as low or high entropy in the snippet.
The third category, structured, refers in most cases to man-
made structures, like buildings: regular, clearly pronounced
edges and corners.
This categorization was already prepared during the creation
of the dataset. We aimed to use a diverse set of scenes,
providing various challenges to the detectors. One challenge of
real-world forgeries is the fact that we have little control over
the creation of the manipulation. As a consequence, the texture
categories are not based on quantitative measures. Instead, we
used the artists’ result on a fuzzy task description, like to
“create a copy with little texture”. Given the fact that real-
world copy-move forgeries are done from artists as well, we
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Fig. 19. Performance in the category nature at image level (left) and pixel
level (right).
found it reasonable to adopt the artists’ viewpoint on CMFD.
Tab. XI shows the assignment of images to categories. For
our evaluation, we did not distinguish the size of the copied
areas. Thus, we compare the three major categories smooth,
rough and structured. The number of motifs per category is
17, 16 and 15, respectively.
Tab. XII, Fig. 22, Fig. 23 and Fig. 24 show the results per
category. On the left side, the results are shown at image level,
on the right side at pixel level. The most notable performance
shift across categories is the relation between keypoint- and
block-based methods. SURF and SIFT perform best in rough
(see Fig. 23), while block-based methods often have an ad-
vantage in smooth (see Fig. 22). In the category structure (see
Fig. 24), block-based and keypoint-based methods perform
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Fig. 20. Performance in the category man-made at image level (left) and
pixel level (right).
similarly well.
XIII. OVERVIEW ON THE FORGERY DATABASE
We comment on the implementation of the benchmarking
framework, with emphasis on its extensibility. Then, we briefly
discuss the choice of the manipulated regions. Finally, we
show all reference manipulations of the database, and their
associated ground truth.
Recall that the database consists of 48 base images and 87
prepared image regions from these images, called snippets.
Base images and snippets are spliced, to simulate a close-to-
real-world copy-move forgery. During splicing, postprocessing
artifacts can be added to the snippets and the final output
images. The software to create tampered images and the
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Fig. 21. Performance in the category mixed at image level (left) and pixel
level (right).
associated ground truth is written in C++ and is best used
with scripts written in Perl. Within the Perl-scripts, a series
of output images can be created by iterating over a parameter
space. For instance, all spliced images with JPEG compression
are obtained by iterating over the JPEG quality parameter
space. We call one such parameterization a configuration.
Upon acceptance of the paper, all images, snippets, code,
scripts and configuration files are made publicly available from
our web page. Note that with the separate building blocks,
it is straightforward to add a copy-move tampering scenario
that has not been addressed so far. For instance, assume
(hypothetically) that one aims to evaluate instead of Gaussian
noise Laplacian noise on the inserted regions. Then, all that is
required from the author is to add a Laplacian noise function
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TABLE XI
CATEGORIZATION OF THE DATABASE BY TEXTURE PROPERTIES.
Assigned images
Category Small copied area Large copied area
Smooth ship, motorcycle, sailing,
disconnected shift, noise
pattern, berries, sails, mask,
cattle, swan, Japan tower,
wading
four babies, Scotland,
hedge, tapestry, Malawi
Rough supermarket, no beach, fish-
erman, barrier, threehun-
dred, writing history, central
park
lone cat, kore, white, clean
walls, tree, christmas hedge,
stone ghost, beach wood,
red tower
Structured bricks, statue, giraffe, dark
and bright, sweets, Mykene,
jellyfish chaos, Egyptian,
window, knight moves
fountain, horses, port, wood
carvings, extension
TABLE XII
RESULTS FOR PLAIN COPY-MOVE AT IMAGE LEVEL (LEFT) AND AT PIXEL
LEVEL (RIGHT), IN PERCENT.
Method Smooth Rough Struct. Smooth Rough Struct.
BLUR 91.89 94.12 96.77 83.47 89.52 85.73
BRAVO 91.89 91.43 96.77 87.51 91.92 88.67
CIRCLE 97.14 96.97 93.75 88.48 93.86 90.54
DCT 89.47 88.89 85.71 77.90 89.47 88.12
DWT 91.89 91.43 90.91 86.94 91.65 88.06
FMT 91.89 96.97 96.77 86.56 92.13 87.76
HU 80.95 80.00 81.08 82.13 84.07 82.59
KPCA 91.89 94.12 93.75 87.48 92.83 90.59
LIN 91.89 100.00 100.00 83.82 90.81 85.56
LUO 94.44 91.43 93.75 86.77 90.72 87.79
PCA 91.89 94.12 88.24 86.62 92.68 90.40
SIFT 73.33 96.97 78.57 48.18 85.99 55.61
SURF 87.50 93.75 90.32 60.18 79.90 69.11
SVD 79.07 80.00 85.71 75.00 90.87 85.96
ZERNIKE 97.14 96.97 93.75 89.41 91.19 90.32
Average 89.48 92.48 91.06 80.70 89.84 84.45
to the C++ code, and to add a matching configuration to the
perl scripts.
Fig. 25, Fig. 26 and Fig. 27 show a preview of the images
and the regions of plain copy-move forgeries, sorted by the
categories smooth, rough and structure. For every tampering
example we show at the top the image containing the “refer-
ence” tampered regions. At the bottom we show the associated
ground truth (with white being the copy-source or copy-
target regions). Note that several aspects vary over the images,
e. g. the size of the copied regions, or the level of detail in the
copied region. Note also, that the assignment of categories
is debatable. For instance, in Fig. 27 the jellyfish image (top
row, third image). Upon close examination, the jellyfish exhibit
pronounced edges, although it is not a man-made structure.
As presented, the copied regions are meaningful, i. e. either
they hide image content, or they emphasize an element of the
picture. Note, however, that the software allows the snippets
to be inserted at arbitrary positions. Thus, one could equally
well create semantically meaningless forgeries. This is often
the case when the copied region is rotated and resampled. In
such cases, the image content becomes (naturally) implausible.
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
Noise [Standard-deviation]
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
F1
-m
ea
su
re
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
Noise [Standard-deviation]
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
F1
-m
ea
su
re
blur
bravo
circle
dct
dwt
fmt
hu
kpca
lin
luo
pca
sift
surf
svd
zernike
2030405060708090100
JPEG-compression [quality-factor]
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
F1
-m
ea
su
re
2030405060708090100
JPEG-compression [quality-factor]
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
F1
-m
ea
su
re
blur
bravo
circle
dct
dwt
fmt
hu
kpca
lin
luo
pca
sift
surf
svd
zernike
0 2 4 6 8 10 20 60 180
Rotation [degree]
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
F1
-m
ea
su
re
0 2 4 6 8 10 20 60 180
Rotation [degree]
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
F1
-m
ea
su
re
blur
bravo
circle
dct
dwt
fmt
hu
kpca
lin
luo
pca
sift
surf
svd
zernike
50 80 91 95 100 105 109 120 200
Scale [%]
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
F1
-m
ea
su
re
50 80 91 95 100 105 109 120 200
Scale [%]
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
F1
-m
ea
su
re
blur
bravo
circle
dct
dwt
fmt
hu
kpca
lin
luo
pca
sift
surf
svd
zernike
1 2 3 4 5 6
Combined effects
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
F1
-m
ea
su
re
1 2 3 4 5 6
Combined effects
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
F1
-m
ea
su
re
blur
bravo
circle
dct
dwt
fmt
hu
kpca
lin
luo
pca
sift
surf
svd
zernike
Fig. 22. Performance in the category smooth at image level (left) and pixel
level (right).
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Fig. 23. Performance in the category rough at image level (left) and pixel
level (right).
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Fig. 24. Performance in the category structure at image level (left) and pixel
level (right).
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25.1 ship 25.2 tapestry 25.3 noise pattern 25.4 four babies 25.5 cattle
25.6 gt ship 25.7 gt tapestry 25.8 gt noise pattern 25.9 gt four babies 25.10 gt cattle
25.11 Scotland 25.12 hedge 25.13 Japan tower 25.14 motorcycle 25.15 mask 25.16 berries
25.17 gt Scot-
land
25.18 gt hedge 25.19 gt Japan tower 25.20 gt motorcycle 25.21 gt
mask
25.22 gt berries
25.23 Malawi 25.24 sailing 25.25
disconnected
shift
25.26 swan 25.27 wading 25.28 sails
25.29 gt Malawi 25.30 gt sail-
ing
25.31 gt
disconnected
shift
25.32 gt swan 25.33 gt wading 25.34 gt sails
Fig. 25. Database images from the category smooth, with annotated ground truth for the “reference forgery”, i. e. without rotation or scaling of the copied
region.
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26.1 no beach 26.2 central park 26.3 supermarket 26.4 fisherman 26.5 clean walls
26.6 gt no beach 26.7 gt central park 26.8 gt supermarket 26.9 gt fisherman 26.10 gt clean walls
26.11 stone ghost 26.12 white 26.13 writing history 26.14 barrier 26.15 red tower
26.16 gt stone ghost 26.17 gt white 26.18 gt writing history 26.19 gt barrier 26.20 gt red tower
26.21 christmas hedge 26.22 lone cat 26.23 beach wood 26.24 kore 26.25 tree
26.26 gt christmas hedge 26.27 gt lone cat 26.28 gt beach wood 26.29 gt kore 26.30 gt tree
26.31 threehundred 26.32 gt threehundred
Fig. 26. Database images from the category rough, with annotated ground truth for the “reference forgery”, i. e. without rotation or scaling of the copied
region.
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27.1 horses 27.2 giraffe 27.3 extension 27.4 jellyfish 27.5 sweets
27.6 gt horses 27.7 gt giraffe 27.8 gt extension 27.9 gt jellyfish chaos 27.10 gt sweets
27.11 window 27.12 Egyptian 27.13 statue 27.14 Mykene 27.15 knight moves
27.16 gt window 27.17 gt Egyptian 27.18 gt statue 27.19 gt Mykene 27.20 gt knight
moves
27.21 port 27.22 fountain 27.23 dark and bright 27.24 bricks 27.25 wood
carvings
27.26 gt port 27.27 gt fountain 27.28 gt dark and bright 27.29 gt bricks 27.30
gt wood
carvings
Fig. 27. Database images from the category structure, with annotated ground truth for the “reference forgery”, i. e. without rotation or scaling of the copied
region.
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